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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court of Canada released its decision of R v Hart in July
of 2014. The decision provided a two-prong framework for assessing the
admissibility of confessions obtained through the undercover police tactic
known as “Mr. Big”. The goal of the framework was to address reliability
concerns, to protect suspects from state abuse, and to reduce the risk of
wrongful convictions. The first prong of the test created a new common
law evidentiary rule, under which Mr. Big obtained confessions are now
presumptively inadmissible. The second prong revamped the existing abuse
of process doctrine.
In this article, the authors review the last five years of judicial
application of the new Hart framework. In total, all 61 cases that applied
Hart were analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively, looking at whether the
goals of the Hart framework have been met, what effect the framework has
had on the admissibility of Mr. Big obtained confessions, and what, if any,
shortcomings the framework has. The authors argue that the flexibility and
discretion built into the Hart framework have resulted in an inconsistent
application of the two-prong test. In the end, the framework has had a
negligible impact on the number of confessions that are admitted.
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I. INTRODUCTION

R

v Hart,1 a case where the use of a Mr. Big obtained confession was
challenged, provided the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) with the
opportunity to acknowledge that there are many issues raised by Mr.
Big operations. These include the operations’ lack of regulation and
concerns around permitting the use of potentially unreliable evidence
obtained through such techniques. The majority decided to regulate the
admissibility of confessions resulting from these stings by creating a twoprong test (“the Hart test”). For the first time in decades, the SCC created a
new common law evidentiary rule as the first prong of the test. The second
prong was an attempt to revamp the abuse of process doctrine.
This paper draws upon a 5-year review of judges’ applications of the
Hart test in subsequent cases. The Hart test had a mixed reception at the
time it was created; some commentators believed that it did not go far
enough in regulating the admissibility of evidence obtained through
questionable police tactics.2 Others believed that it struck an appropriate
balance between the state’s interest in catching criminals, society’s need to
prevent wrongful convictions, and the desire to protect suspects from state
abuse.3 In this article, we conduct an analysis on the new admissibility
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framework and its subsequent application, with the aim of answering the
following questions:
Do the goals of the Hart framework (including the new common law evidentiary
rule) appear to be met?
What was the effect of the framework on the admissibility of Mr. Big obtained
confessions in court?
What, if any, appear to be the shortcomings of the new framework?

First, we will describe the methodology that was employed to conduct
our analysis. Next, we will provide an overview of Mr. Big police
investigations in section II of this paper. Specifically, we will describe what
Mr. Big undercover operations entail, as well as how evidence obtained as a
result of them was dealt with pre-Hart. We will then proceed by discussing
the Hart test, focusing on a more detailed review of its content and goals.
In section III, we will take a deep dive into how the Hart test was applied by
courts between August 2014 and August 2019, through a qualitative and
quantitative analysis of cases. Finally, in section IV, we will interpret our
findings against the goals set out in Hart.

A. Methodology
In evaluating the outcomes of the Hart test, our review included the
Canadian cases decided between August 2014 and August 2019 where the
Hart test was applied. The majority of these cases applied the framework to
a confession obtained by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in a
Mr. Big type operation. In a small number of cases, judges applied the Hart
framework to cases where a confession was obtained through other
undercover tactics employed by the RCMP. Since the purpose of this
analysis is to review the functionality and effects of the framework in its
application, we have included these cases in our analysis. However, the vast
majority of the discussion in this paper is focused on Mr. Big operations.
To search for cases, we used WestlawNext Canada, noting up the Hart
decision. The cases were sorted by date, starting with the oldest cases first.
All of the cases discussing Hart were afforded an initial, cursory scan to
determine whether the Hart test was applied or whether Hart was
mentioned but not applied for any number of reasons. For example, some
judges mentioned Hart outside the context of undercover operations, in
relation to the more general analysis of the probative value versus prejudicial
on Mr. Big and a New Approach to Unreliable Prosecution Evidence” (2015) 71 SCLR
(2d) 475 at 485 [Dufraimont, “Hart and Mack”].

effect of evidence proffered by the Crown in a particular case.4 In other
cases, judges used the framework because it “confirmed that the principle
against self-incrimination, as enshrined in s. 7 of the Charter, is not
restricted to statements obtained through traditional police interviews.”5
Only the cases where the test was actually applied (regardless of what type
of undercover police investigation was used) were flagged as relevant to our
analysis and, therefore, given a more in depth review.
In order to assess whether the subsequent application of the Hart test
met its stated goals, we reviewed whether and how the relevant factors put
forward in Hart were considered for each prong of the test. Specifically, the
factors we tracked were: the personal characteristics of the suspect (age,
mental health, addictions, social, and economical status), the length of the
operation, the relationship between the target and the handler, the
incentives used, the presence of violence or threats, and the presence and
strength of various types of confirmatory evidence. We also assessed the
level of scrutiny that judges applied to these factors.
For the quantitative analysis, we coded the factors by attributing each
one with a value and variables. As an example of coding, Hart mentions a
number of characterises (such as youthfulness, financial situation,
addictions, education, social alienation, and level of sophistication) that the
individual may present and which need to be considered in order to assess
both the prejudicial effect versus probative value and whether the tactics
used amounted to abuse of process. Each of these characteristics was
attributed a value, and the variable could be ‘yes’ (if the trial judge identified
that as present), ‘no’ (if the trial judge did not identify it as being present),
or ‘ND’ (if it was not discussed in the decision). Using SPSS software, we
generated basic statistics indicating the frequency of each factor. We also
used SPSS to create combinations of these factors and to establish their
frequency. For instance, we combined values that indicated a target was
financially destitute with values that indicated the target received significant
financial incentives and values indicating there was no corroborative
evidence present.
This quantitative analysis was used to get a sense of the frequency with
which the factors and combinations of factors listed in Hart negatively
impacted the reliability of a confession (i.e. that increased the prejudice and
decreased the probative value) or increased the likelihood of abuse of
4
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See e.g. R v Clyke, 2019 NSSC 137 at paras 21–22.
R v Ball, 2018 ONSC 4556 at para 63.

process being identified in the cases to which the Hart framework was
applied. We also analyzed whether there appeared to be any correlation
between the presence of the various factors and combinations of factors and
the admission or exclusion of the confession (i.e. if the combination made
it more likely that the evidence would be excluded). In other words, we used
statistical data to determine when confessions were excluded and to create
a numerical picture of the factors that may influence the different ways in
which judges applied the Hart framework.
Through our qualitative analysis, we sought to identify patterns in how
each factor was used to justify the exclusion or admission of evidence. This
required the use of in-text coding of the judges’ language in trial decisions.
We then separated the citations into categories for each of the Hart factors.
This helped piece together a visual narrative of how courts understand and
apply the Hart test, as well as how and to what extent various circumstances
and characteristics of individual targets may factor into the judgement.
Our assessments and conclusions must be read in light of the
limitations of the sources available to us and of the cases that we reviewed.
First, we only had access to cases that made it to trial; we were generally
unable to include cases where the individual pled guilty after confessing6 or
where the RCMP started but did not continue the operation. Second, we
had difficulty finding comparators for most of the variables discussed in our
analysis. We were not able to compare the factors considered post-Hart with
the factors considered pre-Hart. This was because there was no regulation
of Mr. Big confessions prior to Hart and because the factors were not
consistently applied. Furthermore, the pre-Hart case information available
is even more scarce than the information available today. Thus, we had to
limit ourselves to assessing how the Hart framework was applied by judges,
comparing that against the test’s set goals, as opposed to the pre-Hart
treatment of confessions. Third, the number of cases where confessions
were excluded is notably smaller than the number of cases in which
confessions were admitted. This is analyzed more fully later in this paper.
Nonetheless, due to the small number of cases where evidence was
excluded, our statistical analyses were limited.7
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Though there were three cases where the accused pled guilty mid-trial after the
admissibility of the confession was considered. We included those cases as well.
For instance, we were able to run the frequencies of various factors considered and of
combinations of factors, but we were unable to assess statistical relevance.

Finally, our conclusions are the result of our interpretation of certain
patterns identified. The circumstances of the cases reviewed are very
different and not all of the details are available in the reported decisions.
This means that a conclusive analysis is impossible. In addition, the Hart
test incorporates a significant amount of judicial discretion by design, and
trial judges are entitled to deference once they have considered and applied
all of the relevant factors.8 Thus, the findings of this review should not be
interpreted as reflections on the correctness of the individual judges’
decisions to admit or exclude evidence. Rather, the purpose of this review
is to assess how judicial discretion is being exercised and the extent to which
the relevant factors from Hart are discussed.
In an attempt to mitigate some of these limitations, to assess the broader
impact of the admissibility framework on Mr. Big operations, and to
generate more context for our analysis, we submitted a request under the
Access to Information Act to the RCMP.9 We received a response letter10
indicating that the RCMP does not collect any of the data that we requested
and they were, therefore, unable to provide us with any information. This
response is striking. While some of our requests were more detailed and
would require time to gather the information, other aspects of our requests
were straightforward. Considering the large amount of money that goes into
these operations,11 it seems reasonable to assume that, at the very least, the
8
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Hart, supra note 1 at para 110.
The request contained the following questions: The information sought from across Canada
for two periods of time: 1991-July 2014 and July 2014 - 2019. How many Mr. Big operations
have taken been started and completed? How many cases made it to trial based on Mr. Big
collected evidence? How many cases for which a Mr. Big operation was employed did not go to
trial? What were the main reasons? How many Mr. Big operations resulted in conviction after a
trial (excluding guilty pleas)? How many Mr. Big targets have pled guilty? How many cases for
which a Mr. Big operation was employed made it to trial and resulted in an acquittal or a stay?
How many Mr. Big operations were started and then abandoned before the target made a
confession? What are the main reasons? What is the average cost of a Mr. Big operation, what is
the cost of the most expensive and of the cheapest operation? What is the average length of the
surveillance period before contact is made with the target? What is the average, longest and shortest
time for a Mr. Big operation? In how many cases did RCMP start surveillance in a cold case for
a Mr. Big operation but desisted without going any further? What are the main reasons?
Letter in Response to Access to Information Request from the Access to Information
and Privacy Branch, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2 July 2019) A-2019-03433
[RCMP, Letter in Response].
See generally R v Mildenberger, 2015 SKQB 27 [Mildenberger] (“Operation Fiftig” was a 6month long operation with a total cost of $311,815.88); R v Buckley, 2018 NSSC 1
[Buckley] (“Operation Hackman” was a six-month long operation with a forecasted

RCMP would maintain a record of the number of times Mr. Big was
employed as an investigative tactic and the cost of these operations. It is
simply inconceivable that large sums of money would be approved to
conduct and continue Mr. Big investigations without any corresponding
record keeping of these costs.
In Hart, the SCC specifically condemned the lack of monitoring of
these operations.12 Yet, five years after Hart, the RCMP has not improved
their record keeping on even the most basic information regarding these
operations.

II. CONTEXT
A. Mr. Big Undercover Operations and their Pre-Hart
Regulation
Mr. Big operations involve the police creating a fictitious criminal
organization for the purpose of luring a specific suspect into it. Generally,
the police target a single suspect in an unsolved case, with the ultimate goal
of getting that suspect to confess to the crime. The people involved in the
fictitious criminal organization are all either undercover officers or their
agents.13
These operations are planned out in advance in a meticulous and
targeted manner. The suspect is often watched, and sometimes even
wiretapped, for an extended period of time. The police use their surveillance
to learn the suspect’s habits, hobbies, and routines. The police use the
considerable time spent watching their suspect to create a tailored approach
for convincing the target to befriend them or work for them.
The police do not target just anyone. The targeted suspects are often
socially isolated and alienated from those around them. Many of them are
unemployed and have either non-existent or tense family relationships. The
operation works best if the suspect is predisposed to being influenced by
outside pressures, whether due to having a low IQ, having experienced
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budget of $300,000. The actual cost is not reported in the decision). It is note worthy
that in many cases, the costs of these operations are not mentioned in the written
decisions. The RCMP does not release the numbers either.
Hart, supra note 1 at para 80.
Timothy E Moore, Peter Copeland & Regina A Schuller, “Deceit, Betrayal, and the
Search for Truth: Legal and Psychological Perspectives on the ‘Mr. Big’ Strategy” (2009)
55:3 Crim LQ 348 at 348.

social stigma, or having experienced a lifetime of racial discrimination,
mental illness, poverty, or other vulnerabilities.14
Once the suspect is ‘hooked’ (connected to the organization), the
person is quickly befriended by undercover officers and hired to do various
jobs for their fictitious criminal organization. The undercover officers begin
to confide in the suspect, attempting to form a deeper bond. While many
suspects later describe the bond as friendship, some have also said the
undercover officers felt like family.15 The suspect’s involvement in the
organization will progressively intensify. The suspect will begin receiving
jobs that appear to be illegal, and increasingly so.
The climax of a Mr. Big investigation is the introduction of the target
to the boss of the organization (the ‘Mr. Big’ character), either as a reward
for the work the suspect has done or as an interview for a better position
within the organization. Mr. Big will bring up the crime under investigation
and will demand that the suspect tell him the truth about it. If the suspect
denies involvement, Mr. Big employs a variety of tactics to elicit a
confession. He may offer to make the suspect’s legal problems disappear.
He may also go as far as to create an oppressive and fear-inducing
environment or suggest that the individual will have to leave the
organization if he refuses to confess.
The use of Mr. Big obtained evidence in court existed in a legal vacuum
until 2014.16 Confessions obtained through these stings were routinely
admitted at trial under the party admission exception to the exclusionary
hearsay rule.17 Despite the use of violence, derogatory language, and
simulated crime by police agents in these Mr. Big operations, the
confessions obtained still managed to slip through the cracks of any
exclusionary rule in existence at the time. None of the following
exclusionary rules applied: the common law confessions rules (because the
suspect did not know that he was talking to a person in authority), section
7 of the Charter (because the suspect was not in police detention), hearsay
14
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Kouri T Keenan & Joan Brockman, Mr. Big: Exposing Undercover Investigations in Canada
(Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2010) at 50–51 (the authors have determined that from
89 cases, 11 suspects were Indigenous and 29 were from very poor social backgrounds.
Others (though numbers were not available) had very poor education or reduced
cognitive capacity).
Hart, supra note 1 (the Supreme Court noted that the fictitious criminal organization
was “essentially his new family” at para 227).
Ibid at para 79.
Ibid at para 63.

(because it fell under the party admission exception), or the law of
entrapment (because the suspect was not charged with an offence
committed during his involvement with the fictitious organization).18 Yet,
it was not a product of chance that Mr. Big operations somehow managed
to circumvent the letter of all of these laws. Rather, it was by design.19

B. The Hart Framework: Content and Goals
In 2014, Justice Moldaver, writing for the majority in Hart,
acknowledged that Mr. Big operations run significant risks for both the
administration of justice20 and for the suspect.21 In light of these dangers,
routinely admitting confessions resulting from these stings is legally and
ethically problematic.
Justice Moldaver identified three dangers associated with Mr. Big
confessions that needed to be mitigated by any framework that regulated
their admission. First, when powerful inducements or veiled threats are
used to obtain a confession, the risk that the confession is unreliable
increases, potentially leading to a wrongful conviction.22 Second, because
the confessions are obtained in the context of the suspect’s involvement in
what they believe to be criminal activity, there is a high risk of prejudice
towards the accused when this evidence is brought before a trier of fact,
especially a jury.23 The more violent and brutal the scenarios are, the more
likely that the evidence provided will include bad character evidence. Bad
character evidence creates the risk of a jury deciding that the confession was
true and should be believed based on the rationale that someone involved
with a criminal organization is capable of also committing the offence they
confessed to. Justice Moldaver warned that the combination of powerful
inducements or threats used to obtain a confession and the bad character
evidence put before juries significantly increases the risk of a wrongful
conviction.24 Third, these operations may become abusive and coercive.
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See Lisa Dufraimont, “The Patchwork Principle against Self-Incrimination under the
Charter” (2012) 57 SCLR (2d) 241 at 258–62; Coughlan, supra note 2 at 417–18.
Coughlan, supra note 2 at 438.
Supra note 1 at paras 10, 83.
Ibid at paras 79, 83.
Ibid para 6.
Ibid at paras 74, 145.
Ibid at para 8.

Police tactics that overbear the will of the accused should not be permitted
in obtaining a confession.25
For the first prong of the test, the SCC created a new common law
confession rule. Under this new rule, all Mr. Big confessions are now
presumptively inadmissible.26 The onus is on the Crown to show at the
admissibility stage that, on a balance of probabilities, the probative value of
the evidence is higher than its prejudicial effect.27 Justice Moldaver provides
a set of criteria that should be considered by the trial judge in assessing
whether the Crown has discharged its burden.
Probative value is determined by the strength of the particular
guarantees of reliability; these may derive either from the confession itself
or from the circumstances surrounding the confession.28 Circumstances
that should be considered for the purpose of assessing reliability include:
the length of the operation, the number of interactions between police
agents and the target, the nature of the relations established, the type of
inducements used, the presence of threats, the conduct of the police, and
the personality of the target (including age, sophistication, and mental
health).29 Other markers of reliability which increase the probative value of
the confession include the level of detail of the confession, whether the
confession led to any new evidence, and if the target identified elements of
the crime which were not made public (so-called ‘holdback evidence’).
Corroborative evidence is not necessarily required but, where it does exist,
it significantly increases the reliability of a confession.30
When considering the prejudicial effect of a Mr. Big confession, the
judge must be attentive to the moral prejudice that may exist (that is, if the
operation portrays the accused as a violent man or having a violent past, he
could be seen as a ‘bad person’) or reasoning prejudice that may confuse the
jury (depending on the amount of time needed to detail the operation and
controversy over certain events or conversations).31 The trial judge will
decide whether this threshold reliability has been met and the court of
appeal must defer to the trial judge’s decision on this matter.32
25
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Ibid at para 11.
Ibid at para 85.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 102.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 206.
Ibid at para 106.
Ibid at para 110.

If the first prong is met, the judge is then required to consider the
second prong. The second prong is essentially a restatement of the abuse of
process doctrine: that the police cannot overcome the will of the accused
and use coercion to obtain a confession.33 During the second prong, the
burden shifts to the accused to provide evidence of abuse of process. In their
assessment, the judge will need to consider if violence or threats of violence
were used against the target. If so, it will generally render the operation
abusive and the confession should be excluded.34 However, there are other
aspects that should be considered in order to assess if the target was
oppressed, specifically whether the police have preyed on a person with
vulnerabilities (including mental health issues, addictions, or
youthfulness).35
The SCC had the opportunity to demonstrate how the majority’s test
applies in a companion case, R v Mack.36 In assessing the first prong, the
important role of confirmatory evidence was highlighted by the Court.37
Information on holdback evidence or that leads to the discovery of real
evidence play a significant role in outweighing heavy prejudice against the
accused. In addition, Mack also emphasized the role that threats and
violence play in increasing prejudice and decreasing probative value. As
there were no direct threats and violence present in this case, the Court
deemed that the prejudicial value against Mack was low.38 For the second
prong, the SCC found that there was no abuse of process because no
overwhelming inducements or threats of violence were used in the
operation.39 Interestingly, the SCC found that there were, in fact, veiled
threats of violence through references to previous acts of violence
committed by other members of the organization, but they ultimately
found that this form of intimidation did not amount to coercion.40
Following the Hart and Mack decisions, some critics were skeptical of
how this new framework would play out in practice given that the very
33
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Ibid at para 115.
Ibid at para 11.
Ibid at para 117.
2014 SCC 58 [Mack]. The case was jurisprudentially important for the guidelines on
jury instruction with regard to Mr. Big evidence. However, jury instructions will not be
discussed in this paper, which instead focuses on issues of admissibility.
Ibid at para 34.
Ibid at para 35.
Ibid at para 36.
Ibid.

foundations of these operations are coercion, deceit, and veiled threats.41
They were also concerned that the creators of Mr. Big operations would
adapt to the new framework, finding creative ways to again elude the black
letter law. There were additional concerns that the criteria provided by the
Hart framework would be watered down as it was applied in future cases.42
Nonetheless, Hart also received praise, with some scholars expressing
hope that the new framework would have a chilling effect on Mr. Big
operations which will decrease in both number and intensity.43 Some
scholars praised the framework for providing new tools to be used in the
fight against wrongful convictions,44 for being a more culturally sensitive
approach that considers an individual’s vulnerabilities,45 for better
preserving Charter values,46 for encouraging courts to be more vigorous in
assessing these confessions,47 and for reinvigorating the abuse of process
doctrine and providing stronger protections against state abuse.48
For the remainder of this article, we will assess if, based on the
information available, any of these predictions have proven true in the past
5 years and if the goals set by Hart (to prevent the use of unreliable evidence,
the prejudice to the accused, and police misconduct during the operation)
appear to be met through the subsequent applications of this framework.
41
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MacLean & Chapman, supra note 2 at 188–89; Luther & Snook, supra note 2 at 133–
38.
Iftene, supra note 2 at 166–68; Kaiser, supra note 2 at 307–08; Hunt & Rankin, supra
note 2 at 333–35; MacLean & Chapman, supra note 2 at 188–89; Luther and Snook,
supra note 2 at 133–38; Coughlan, supra note 2 at 416–18; Stephen Porter, Katherine
Rose & Tianna Dilley, “Enhanced Interrogations: The Expanding Roles of Psychology
in Police Investigations in Canada” (2016) 57:1 Can Psychol 35 at 37; Christina J
Connors, Marc W Patry & Steven M Smith, “The Mr. Big Technique on Trial by Jury”
(2018) 25:1 Psychology Crime & L 1 at 18, 21 DOI: <10.1080/1068316X.2018.14835
07>.
Dufraimont, “Hart and Mack”, supra note 3 at 486–89; Adrianna Poloz, “Motive to Lie?
A Critical Look at the ‘Mr. Big’ Investigative Technique” (2015) 19:2 Can Crim L Rev
231 at 237–39.
Nikos Harris, “Less-Travelled Exclusionary Path: Sections 7 and 24(1) of the Charter
and R v Hart” (2014) 7 CR (7th) 287 at 287; Tanovich, supra note 3 at 299.
Tanovich, supra note 3 at 298.
Hart, supra note 1 at paras 121, 168; Adrien Iafrate, “Unleashing the Paper Tiger: How
the Abuse of Process Doctrine Can Overcome Charter Limitations” (2017) 64:1/2
Crim LQ 147.
Dufraimont, “Hart and Mack”, supra note 3 at 499.
Lisa Dufraimont, “R v Nuttall and R v Derbyshire: Abuse of Process and Undercover
Operation” (2016) 31 CR (7th) 315 at 315, 317.

III. THE APPLICATION OF THE HART FRAMEWORK AUGUST
2014–AUGUST 2019
A. Overview
Between 2014 and 2019, there were 61 cases in which the Hart test was
applied to determine the admissibility of confessions obtained through
RCMP undercover operations (see the Appendix of this article). Two of
these cases were not a result of a Mr. Big operation49 and 59 were. The
confession was admitted by the trial judge in 51 cases. In three cases, the
evidence was excluded based on the new common law confession rule (lack
of reliability)50 and it was excluded in four cases due to abuse of process.51
In three cases, it was unclear whether the confession was or would have been
excluded because the accused pled guilty after or during the admissibility
voir dire.52
In all but two cases53 where the confession was admitted, the accused
was found guilty. There were three cases where the confession was excluded
and the following outcomes resulted: the case was dismissed, the Crown
withdrew its case, and the accused was acquitted due to a lack of Crown
evidence.54 In two of the cases where the confession was thrown out, the
accused was found guilty at trial, but a stay was entered on appeal.55 In the
other two cases the outcome of the case is unknown, as the trial decision
was not reported.56
As illustrated in the Appendix, numerous cases were never appealed or,
when they were appealed, the trial verdict was upheld. In addition to the
49
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R v Giles, 2015 BCSC 1744 [Giles]; R v Derbyshire, 2016 NSCA 67 [Derbyshire].
Buckley, supra note 11 at paras 100–01; Smith v Ontario, 2016 ONSC 7222 at para 31
[Smith]; R v South, 2018 ONSC 604 at para 75 [South].
R v Nuttall, 2016 BCSC 1404 at paras 2, 7 [Nuttall]; R v M(S), 2015 ONCJ 537 at paras
71–73 [M(S)]; R v Laflamme, 2015 QCCA 1517 at paras 87–88 [Laflamme]; Derbyshire,
supra note 49 at para 153.
R v Gill, 2017 BCSC 1026; R v Duncan, 2015 BCSC 2688 [Duncan]; R v Pernosky, 2018
BCSC 1252 [Pernosky]. However, we can speculate that the confession in these cases was
either admitted or was likely to be admitted, otherwise it is unlikely that the accused
would have decided to change his plea.
R v Streiling, 2015 BCSC 1044 at para 73 [Streiling]; R v Tingle, 2016 SKQB 212 at paras
404–05 [Tingle].
Buckley, supra note 11; Smith, supra note 50; Derbyshire, supra note 49 at para 6,
respectively.
Laflamme, supra note 51; Nuttall, supra note 51.
M(S), supra note 51; South, supra note 50.

two cases where a stay was entered on appeal, in seven cases a retrial was
ordered by the Court of Appeal.57 In two cases58, the accused persons pled
guilty to lesser offences after being granted retrials.59 In two other cases, the
retrials resulted in the accused persons being found guilty again.60 The
remaining three retrials have not yet been heard or reported.61
Between 1990 and 2008, Mr. Big was allegedly used a total of 350 times,
with the majority of cases prosecuted resulting in a conviction.62 If this
number is accurate, it means that prior to Hart, there were 14 cases on
average, per year (including those that made it and did not make it to trial).
Since Hart, there have been 11 cases per year that have made it to trial. Note
that this number does not account for some of the unreported cases where
the accused pled guilty, unreported cases that did not result in trial for any
other reason, or cases which were ongoing at the time of our review.
Therefore, Hart does not appear to have had any impact on either the
number of cases brought to trial or the number of cases where the evidence
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was excluded based on either of the framework’s prongs.63 The fact that
most operations (all but eight)64 were completed or started pre-Hart
indicates that the Hart factors would not have been considered when
designing the operations. It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that
the confessions considered by judges since 2014 originated from operations
designed pre-Hart (and which, as discussed below, continued to include the
problematic features criticized in Hart), these confessions were still mostly
admitted when judges applied the Hart framework.

B. Application of the Two Prongs by Numbers and
Narratives
1. Reliability of the Evidence
The first prong described by Justice Moldaver in Hart is the new
common law confession rule. Under the first prong, a trial judge must assess
the reliability of the evidence by weighing the probative value against the
potential prejudice to eliminate the possibility of false confessions and
minimize the prejudice towards the accused.65 In searching for markers of
reliability in a Mr. Big confession under the first prong, the following should
be considered: the length of the operation, the nature of the relations
established, the type of inducements used, the presence of threats, the
conduct of the police,66 the personality of the target (including age,
sophistication, and mental health), and the presence or absence of confirmatory evidence.67 The SCC clarified that:
In listing these factors, I do not mean to suggest that trial judges are to consider
them mechanically and check a box when they apply. That is not the purpose of
the exercise. Instead, trial judges must examine all the circumstances leading to
and surrounding the making of the confession — with these factors in mind — and
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and content of the Mr. Big operations themselves.
R v Amin, 2019 ONSC 3059 [Amin]; Buckley, supra note 11; R v Burkhard, 2019 ONSC
1218 [Burkhard]; R v Caissie, 2018 SKQB 279 [Caissie]; R v Darling, 2018 BCSC 1327; R
v Lee, 2018 ONSC 308 [Lee]; Pernosky, supra note 52; R v Potter, 2019 NLSC 8 [Potter].
Hart, supra note 1 at paras 94–110.
The conduct of the police is generally discussed in the reviewed cases in the context of
the other factors (under categories such as use of threats or incentives); hence, we were
not able to factor it into our analysis separately.
Hart, supra note 1 at paras 102–04.

assess whether and to what extent the reliability of the confession is called into
doubt.68

Under this prong, three cases were excluded.69 In all three cases, not only
was there no confirmatory evidence, but the confessions contradicted other
evidence that the police had. In South, the target (not South) had significant
difficulty providing reliable information on the identity of the accused: that
the confession was “so unreliable that no reasonable factfinder could accept
it as true.”70 In Buckley, the target recited the details from his disclosure
materials and, when probed on other details, he contradicted the forensic
evidence that he did not have access to.71
i. Threats and/or Exposure to Violence
Threats and/or exposure to violence were used in 8% of the cases.72
With two exceptions,73 all of the confessions from Mr. Big stings involving
threats and exposure to violence were admitted. However, in both cases
where the confessions were excluded, it was based on the second prong
(abuse of process), not due to a reliability issue.
In fact, threats and violence were not generally discussed in connection
with reliability. Yet, both threats and violence were deemed in Hart to have
bearing on the common law confession rule. The presence of coercion
makes a confession less reliable and thus decreases its probative value. In
addition, the risk of prejudice to the accused is higher if he or she was
involved in violent scenarios because the jury may be influenced by a history
of violence (that is, it would be bad character evidence).74
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114. All three were Mr. Big cases and all three failed on reliability. However, in South,
the Hart framework was loosely applied. The confession was excluded not based on the
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Supra note 11 at para 55.
R v RK, 2016 BCSC 552 at paras 12, 44 [RK]; Tingle, supra note 53 at paras 28–31;
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R v Randle, 2016 BCCA 125 at paras 42–43 [Randle], Laflamme, supra note 51 at para
56; Derbyshire, supra note 49 at paras 59, 61.
Laflamme, supra note 51; Derbyshire, supra note 49.
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Justice Moldaver said in Hart that confirmatory evidence can go a long
way in increasing the probative value of a confession.75 However, this
explanation for why confessions obtained in violent scenarios were
admitted only holds up in Potter, where the confession contained a lot of
holdback information and details that went beyond the mundane aspects
of the crime.76 In Balbar, there was some confirmatory evidence (that is,
information provided by the accused that was not publicly available) but it
contained numerous inconsistencies.77 In RK, Randle, and Tingle, there was
no confirmatory evidence of any kind.78
Another issue raising concerns about the narrative employed around
violence was the tendency to use the accused’s willingness to partake in the
criminal organization and their criminal past as evidence to increase
probative value. A history of crime or violence is generally considered to be
prejudicial; when used at trial, it may amount to bad character evidence and
should be excluded.79 It is true that the willingness to engage in violent
scenarios or past history is used at the admissibility stage to establish the
likelihood that the individual voluntarily engaged in that type of criminal
organization. Thus, it is not used as true propensity evidence in the sense
that the accused has likely committed the offence due to their record.
However, if the Mr. Big scenario is admitted to trial, that can also be
considered bad character evidence and should, at the very least, be edited
or a warning to the jury should be given. Not only did the judges find that
the use of violence did not increase the prejudice or decrease the probative
value of the confession, but in the cases of Balbar, Potter, RK, and Randle,
the target’s openness with the crime boss was highlighted as evidence of the
target not feeling personally threatened by the violent scenarios they were
exposed to and the unedited scenarios made it into the trial. For example:80
Given the nature of the murder being investigated, it is understandable that police
would want to create an atmosphere in which [the target] would feel comfortable
discussing violence involving the use of firearms.81
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Mr. Balbar was more than willing to participate in activities involving crime and
threatened and feigned violence directed towards others.82
Mr. Potter spoke to Cpl. R. of his own volition and he was ready, willing and even
eager to do whatever he could to endear himself to Cpl. R. so he could work with
him.83

There is no mention of the possibility that these targets spoke to the crime
boss precisely because of fear. If arguments such as “confessing after
exposure to violence is an indication of comfort” or “someone previously
involved in crime would not be intimidated by violence” are found by
judges to increase probative value of a confession, it is unclear if anything
short of physically beating the confession out of the target would count as
coercion. We suggest that this type of analysis does not represent the spirit
of the Hart framework and it raises further issues regarding abuse of process.
This is discussed more in the next chapter.
ii. Vulnerabilities
Hart held that, in assessing the probative value of a confession,
particular attention ought to be paid where the target has identifiable
vulnerabilities.84 Vulnerabilities of the target may negatively influence the
reliability of the confession, given that the operation itself revolves around
manipulation and vulnerable targets may be easier to coerce into wrongly
confessing in certain circumstances.
In 67% of all of the cases and 54% of the cases where the evidence was
admitted, the trial judge identified the presence of at least one vulnerability
(this distribution is shown in Table 1). In 16% of all of the cases, the judge
specifically noted that the target had no identifiable vulnerability. In all of
these latter cases, the confession was admitted.
In 17% of the cases, the presence or absence of vulnerabilities was not
mentioned at all in the decision. In light of the prominent role that these
play in Mr. Big stings and the SCC’s direction that the presence of
vulnerabilities should be incorporated into the analysis, we question how
thorough the analyses conducted in some of these cases have been.
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Table 1: Distribution of Cases Where Vulnerabilities Were Identified Based on Types of
Vulnerabilities

Vulnerability identified
History of abuse
Unstable housing
Lack of sophistication
Mental health illnesses other than
addiction
Addiction
Youth (under 25)
No family or social ties
Significant financial difficulties
Total

% (n)
8% (5)
8% (5)
20% (12)
15% (9)
20% (12)
23% (14)
26% (16)
31% (19)
67% (41)

* In some cases, more than one variable applies

Upon reviewing the cases where vulnerabilities were identified, several
patterns regarding the manner in which judges incorporated these traits as
markers of reliability in their analyses were apparent.
First, certain types of vulnerability appear to be given less consideration
than others. For instance, despite the fact that Hart mentioned youthfulness
as one of the vulnerabilities that ought to be given special consideration in
an analysis,85 young age (where the individual is in their late teens or early
20s) is often not addressed in a nuanced or consistent manner by judges.
In some instances, young age is mentioned in the decision simply as part of
the description of the accused person (essentially just ‘background
information’)86 or discussed in some contexts but not in relation to the
probative value versus prejudicial effect analysis. For example, the accused
was 15 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged offence in R v
M(S).87 His youthfulness was discussed in depth in relation to the law of
statements made to police by young persons under the Youth Criminal Justice
Act (YCJA), but the impact of his youthfulness on the reliability of the
confession was not analyzed.
85
86

87

Ibid at para 103.
Lee, supra note 64 at para 125; R v Omar, 2016 ONSC 4065 at para 7 [Omar]; RK, supra
note 72 at para 15.
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based on abuse of process, not reliability.

There was also at least one instance where the youthfulness of the
accused was not even mentioned in the decision, let alone factored into the
probative value analysis. For example, in R v Tang88 the accused was only 22
years old at the time of the alleged commission of the offence. We identified
his age through news articles published during his trial.89 There are several
decisions we reviewed where age is not mentioned; it is possible then that
youthfulness has been disregarded in more instances than we were able to
identify.
We also noted a pattern that showed that age was often minimized by
judges through qualifiers like the young person having ‘street smarts’90 or
the appearance of maturity.91 For instance, in Lee, the judge commented
that “[w]hile he may not have been well-educated, he was street smart. He
was young, but he was not naïve.”92 Mr. Lee was 23 years old with a grade 9
education. His mother had died of cancer when he was 15 years old. His
father was an abusive alcoholic. Mr. Lee was poor and sold drugs to support
himself. Despite the police creating scenarios which involved financial
inducements and tasking Mr. Lee with collecting items needed to dispose
of a body, the confession to Mr. Big was admitted “with some modest
editing.”93
Once again, there appeared to be a trend to use past violent or criminal
behavior to minimize vulnerabilities and increase the probative value of the
confession. For example, in R v Subramaniam, despite the accused person
being only 19 years of age and the judge recognizing that “youthfulness is
an element that must be seriously taken into consideration”,94 his
youthfulness is juxtaposed with his criminal record: “Subramaniam cannot
be described as a weak individual. The record shows that he is already
evolving in the criminal world at the time of the events.”95
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Second, addictions and mental illnesses tended to be given only a
cursory mention if there was no concrete evidence that the police directly
took advantage of them. Mr. Balbar had severe addictions and low
intellectual abilities. The judge commented:
On this basis, I am unable to find that Mr. Balbar had a sufficiently low level of
intellectual capacity or adaptive functioning so as to warrant a finding that he was
too vulnerable a person to be a target in Project Eventail. To the contrary, the
evidence of how Mr. Balbar actually behaved during the Mr. Big operation and the
very limited evidence about his background and lifestyle portrays a person who
may be of limited intelligence, yet, for whatever reason, possesses considerable
"street smarts" and an eclectic store of knowledge and skills, the full extent of which
remains unknown.96

Third, the financial situation of the target generally did not impact any
analyses. Even in cases where the target’s financial situation was bad, they
were on social assistance, had a long history of unemployment and social
isolation, and large financial incentives were provided, there was still no
impact on the probative value of the confession because the target was not
“destitute”.97
Finally, it is worth noting that in many cases, regardless of the
vulnerabilities identified, these were often just noted and not fully engaged
with. They were, thus, used by judges as a checklist, which Justice Moldaver
specifically warned against in Hart.98 In a number of cases where a target’s
vulnerabilities were discussed by judges more thoroughly, the conclusion
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was that the police did not prey on the target’s vulnerabilities, despite
recognizing that they had vulnerabilities that the police were aware of.99
We suggest that, based on the multitude of cases in which the targets
had identifiable vulnerabilities, as well as the superficial and inconsistent
manner in which judges sometimes factored them into their analysis, courts
may frequently struggle with understanding the impact of the presence of
vulnerabilities on the reliability of confessions. These concerns are
amplified in cases where significant incentives were used and where there
was a complete lack of confirmatory evidence. This is discussed more fully
in the next sections.
iii. Incentives
Mr. Big operations revolve around the idea of incentives. Incentives are
what motivate an individual to join the organization and eventually confess
that they committed a serious offence. Thus, it is not a question of whether
there were incentives provided in Mr. Big operations; that is a given. The
question is how strong those incentives were. In Hart, Justice Moldaver
expressed concerns about some incentives being so strong that they could
lead individuals into false confessions.100 Thus, the stronger the incentive
offered in exchange for the confession, the lower the probative value.101
The strength of an incentive cannot be assessed in isolation. It is directly
linked to the personality of the accused. For instance, money and jobs are
much stronger incentives for someone in dire economic circumstances than
for someone who has financial stability. Similarly, alcohol is a weak
incentive unless someone has an addiction and lacks the money necessary
to feed it. People with lower levels of sophistication or mental disabilities
may be more easily enticed by seemingly weaker incentives. Justice Moldaver
emphasized that incentives need to be considered contextually, in
conjunction with the presence or absence of vulnerabilities and
confirmatory evidence.102 Justice Moldaver’s approach should, theoretically,
allow for a balanced analysis that meets the goals of the Hart framework. It
raises red flags that there was no reference to the presence or absence of
99
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incentives in 20% of the cases. In 5% of the cases, the judge noted that the
incentives used were mild (usually involving some type of promise). In 75%
of the cases, the judge identified at least one stronger incentive that was
utilized. This distribution is shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Distribution of Cases Where Incentives Were Used, Based on Types of Incentives

Incentive used
Money/attractive lifestyle
Meaningful friendships/family-like
relationships
Good employment
Promise that their legal issues will
disappear
Total

% (n)
66% (40)
44% (27)
5% (3)
20% (12)
75% (46)

* In some cases, more than one variable applies

Numerically, the presence of strong incentives did not appear to make
a difference on whether the confession was admitted. In 67% of the cases
where evidence was admitted, identifiable incentives were used. While this
statistic is of concern, it is not problematic on its own, as the strength of an
incentive should be analyzed contextually. Nonetheless, upon a qualitative
analysis, we were once again able to discern some problematic trends in how
incentives are factored into the decision.
First, contrary to the suggestion in Hart, large sums of money never
appeared to be considered by judges to be strong enough incentives to
decrease probative value, even when used for a target who was unemployed
or destitute.103 For example, the target in Allgood was introduced to a lifestyle
of expensive restaurants and hotels.104 He was paid $8,500 over four months
and all of his expenses were covered by the organization. He was also
promised a $25,000 payout. Prior to the operation, Mr. Allgood was
unemployed with no job prospects. In R v Zvolensky,105 the undercover
officer promised to significantly fund the purchase of a business that he and
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the target would run together (including telling the target that he had
$500,000 to invest in the business). Mr. Zvolensky was told that he would
become the manager. The undercover officer even bought Mr. Zvolensky
expensive clothes “so he would look like a businessman.”106
The strong bonds that developed between the target and operatives
never contributed to a finding of a lack of reliability in the confession,
despite the fact that the relationship could factor in as an incentive to
confess (fear that they may lose that relationship if they did not confess to
what the operative wants to hear). Hart listed the creation of strong bonds
as a distinct factor that should be considered in any analysis, as it may be
easier to persuade someone to confess in the context of a close
relationship.107
In half of the cases reviewed, the judges noted that those relationships
were central to the case. For instance, the target in Allgood stated that he felt
he was treated like a family member, in addition to receiving significant
amounts of money.108 Similarly, in the cases of Hales and Niemi, the targets
stated that they felt the undercover officers were like brothers to them.109 In
M(M), the undercover operative and target developed a strong
mentor/mentee relationship.110 In Moir, the target was enticed by “a sense
of importance, collegiality, friendship, and respect.”111 In Perreault, the court
noted: “[t]he scenarios were also designed to forge a bond between the
appellant and the primary police operative, whom he considered his best
friend and whom he trusted completely.”112 In Subramaniam, the 19 year-old
target had a history of addictions and fell in love with the operative.113 In
M(S), the father of the target was employed as an agent of the state. The
target was young and desperate to have a relationship with his father who
had not been part of his life until that point.114 In all of these cases, the
judges did not even consider these foundational relationships as incentives
106
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that may have persuaded the target to confess.
Finally, the promise that the organization could make the target’s legal
issues disappear was commonly employed. Such promises were generally
brushed away by judges and, while mentioned, their impacts on the targets
were not discussed.115 This is surprising, given that the targets were often
made to believe that their arrest was imminent and that they were often
provided with the opportunity to witness other people’s alleged problems
being solved by the organization. The lack of emphasis on this issue may be
due to the fact that the promise is not made by someone the suspect knows
to be a person in authority and hence, someone who is legally able to make
the suspect’s issues disappear. Yet, when faced with an imminent arrest
(even for a crime the suspect did not commit), a promise to make it go away
seems equally persuasive when the person making it has the perceived
power, whether legal or otherwise, to do so. Once again, this was all the
more problematic in cases where no confirmatory evidence (discussed
below) was present.
iv. Length of the Operation
The operation in Hart lasted four months and involved 63 scenarios.
The SCC described it as “lengthy”116 and factored that into their analysis. A
longer operation, thus, may be indicative of an increased potential for
coercion, but it also runs the risk of increasing both the moral prejudice
against the accused (because the accused voluntarily stayed involved in a
criminal organization for a long time) and the reasoning prejudice (a long,
convoluted operation may confuse the jury).117
In many of the post-Hart cases, the duration of the operations was
longer than four months and often included a similar, or an even greater,
number of scenarios118 (Table 3). The longest operation, R v Ader,119 lasted
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eight years.
Table 3: Distribution of Cases Based on the Length of the Operation

Length of Operation
< 3 months
3–5 months
6–11 months
12 months or more
ND
Total

% (n)
9.8 (6)
37.7 (23)
31.1 (19)
4.9 (3)
16.4 (10)
100 (61)

The length of the operation was never discussed in any of the cases
involving lengthy operations; rather it was only mentioned as background
information on the case. In 16% of the cases, information on the length
was altogether absent. While it may be understandable that the length of
the operation had less of an impact on the confession’s reliability in cases
where there was strong confirmatory evidence (as an example),120 it is
concerning (and contrary to the guidance from Hart) that judges do not
even discuss this as a factor worthy of consideration.
It was more likely that judges would engage with the length when the
operation was somewhat short;121 however, the manner in which length was
factored into the decision was not consistent. In some cases, the short length
was cited as a factor that reduced the prejudice.122 In other cases, such as
Potter, the judge found that the four month operation was rushed because
the operative wanted to expose Mr. Potter to criminal activity that simulated
the crime they were investigating.123 The officer mentioned that he would
usually plan a Mr. Big operation to be longer in duration and would involve
“40 to 60 scenarios, allowing more time for him and the target to be at ease
120

121

122

123

Ibid. In Ader, for instance, his confession to Mr. Big included strong confirmatory
evidence, including details of his role in the kidnapping and references to ‘holdback’
details that would have only been known by someone who was involved in the
commission of the offence.
However, in the case of a number shorter operations, length was still not discussed as a
relevant factor: M(S), supra note 51 (two months); Worme, supra note 57 at para 7 (2
months); Niemi, supra note 98 at para 14 (2.5 months); West, supra note 98 (3 months).
Tang, supra note 88 at para 59 (less than a month); Knight, supra note 90 at para 5 (3
months and 9 days).
Supra note 64 at para 134.

with each other.”124 Thus, what was deemed as a short length and fewer
interactions had a negative impact on the probative value of the confession.
While entirely speculative at this stage, it is possible that the courts’
approach to length is indicative of an emerging trend that is perhaps an
unintended, collateral consequence of Hart. Given that Hart placed an
increased value on confirmatory evidence, obtaining confirmation may
require longer operations. As a result, courts may be willing to overlook
length in the hopes of encouraging the police to invest more time in seeking
confirmation for the confessions they obtain.
v. Presence of Confirmatory Evidence
Hart seems to suggest that strong confirmatory evidence125 may often
overcome heavy prejudice and limit the negative impact of identifiable
vulnerabilities and incentives on the target. Justice Moldaver noted that:
Confirmatory evidence is not a hard and fast requirement, but where it exists, it
can provide a powerful guarantee of reliability. The greater the concerns raised by
the circumstances in which the confession was made, the more important it will
be to find markers of reliability in the confession itself or the surrounding
evidence.126

In 70% of the cases, there was some confirmatory evidence in the form
of either a detailed confession that included holdback information (44%),127
a confession that led to some real evidence (10%),128 independently
obtained evidence for confirmation (5%),129 or forensics confirming details
given by the target in the confession (11%).130 In some cases, there were
124
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Ibid at para 136.
What we are referring to as confirmatory evidence (based on our case review and on
Hart) includes: holdback information, independently obtained evidence, and forensic
confirmation of details in the confession.
Hart, supra note 1 at para 105.
See e.g. Ader, supra note 119; Balbar, supra note 72 at para 192; Beliveau, supra note 57;
Hales, supra note 109 at para 141; Keene, supra note 98 at paras 83–84; Klaus, supra note
115 at para 115; M(M), supra note 90; MacDonald, supra note 98 at para 18; Mildenberger,
supra note 11 at para 79; Moir, supra note 99 at paras 41, 77–79; Potter, supra note 64 at
paras 129–31; Tang, supra note 88 at para 54; Subramaniam, supra note 94 at para 82;
Shaw, supra note 99; Shyback, 2017 ABQB 332 at paras 18–20 [Shyback]; Wilson, supra
note 98 at para 2; West, supra note 98 at para 88–89.
Carlick, supra note 98 at paras 60–61; Handlen, supra note 98; Keene, supra note 98; Omar,
supra note 86 at paras 49–55.
Burkhard, supra note 64 at para 96; Omar, supra note 86 at paras 53–55; Perreault, supra
note 57; Zvolensky, supra note 98 at para 86.
Burkhard, supra note 64 at paras 91–92; Omar, supra note 86 at para 49; Streiling, supra

multiple types of confirmatory evidence. Whenever the judge listed
confirmatory evidence of any kind, the importance of such evidence in
increasing the confession’s reliability was always highlighted. In all but one
case,131 the confession was admitted where confirmatory evidence was
present, regardless of the type or quality.
It appears that courts have taken the position that confirmatory
evidence (regardless of quality) is a sufficient condition for proving
reliability, but not a necessary one. For instance, confessions were admitted
in cases where the target was identified as vulnerable and/or where strong
incentives were used and where the “confirmatory” evidence was deemed
inconsistent or its accuracy could not be confirmed.132 There were also cases
where some confirmatory evidence was mentioned, but it was not engaged
with or it was not provided with meaning in the context of the other
factors.133
Moreover, in 30% of the cases, the judges either did not discuss
confirmatory evidence at all or specifically mentioned that it did not exist.134
It is of concern that in 18% of the cases, the evidence was admitted, despite
the fact that the target had at least one identifiable vulnerability and there
was no confirmatory evidence.135 In at least five of the cases where the
evidence was admitted, the target had a vulnerability (including financial,
social alienation, addiction, mental illness, or a combination of these), at
least one incentive was used (including money, promises to make the legal
issues go away, friendship, or a combination of these), there was no
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note 53.
Derbyshire, supra note 49. There was significant confirmatory evidence, but the
confession was excluded as having been obtained through abuse of process. Notably,
Derbyshire is not a Mr. Big case.
Balbar, supra note 72 at paras 337, 366; R v Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35 at paras 88–89;
Carlick, supra note 98 at para 59; Jeanvenne, supra note 57 at paras 47–53; Subramaniam,
supra note 94 at paras 86, 89; Wruck, supra note 99 at paras 37–38.
See e.g. M(M), supra note 90 at paras 127–28, 136, 146; Shyback, supra note 127 at paras
18–20.
Bernard, supra note 57; R v Campeau, 2015 ABCA 210; Duncan, supra note 52; Giles,
supra note 49; M(S), supra note 51; Niemi, supra note 98; Charlie, supra note 98; Caissie,
supra note 64 at paras 245–46; Johnston, supra note 97; Larue, supra note 57; Ledesma,
supra note 57; R v Skiffington, 2019 BCSC 178; Tingle, supra note 53; Randle, supra note
72.
See e.g. Randle, supra note 72 at paras 78, 81; Niemi, supra note 98 at para 36; Allgood,
supra note 97 at para 58; Amin, supra note 64 at para 38; Johnston, supra note 97 at paras
21, 58; Ledesma, supra note 57; MacDonald, supra note 98 at paras 4, 10, 23.

confirmatory evidence, and the target was under 25 years of age.136 In two
of these cases, in addition to the presence of these factors and the lack of
confirmation, threats were used and the targets were involved in violent
scenarios.137 A similar combination of factors was identified in four other
cases where the confession was excluded.138 Yet, with the notable exception
of Buckley, the exclusion in these other cases was still not due to the Crown’s
inability to establish reliability. Rather, the confession was excluded due to
an abuse of process.139
In the cases where there was no confirmatory evidence, the judges never
engaged with its absence in the analysis. In other words, the absence of
confirmatory evidence was ignored when assessing reliability, while the
presence of vulnerabilities and incentives was minimized, as described in
the previous sections.
While the sample is too small to claim statistical significance, it is
suggestive that the creation of the new common law evidentiary rule does
not appear to have influenced the admissibility of confessions. This is not
only because very few confessions have been excluded, but because it is
unclear what would constitute unreliable or reliable evidence based on the
applications of the Hart test. It is not just that there are some discrepancies
in the weight judges place on each factor; that would be understandable
given that judicial discretion is permitted in this matter.140 The bigger issues
are that, 61 cases after Hart, there is still no trace of a pattern in how the
various factors are balanced, some of these factors are not always considered,
and oftentimes, even when they are considered, the judge’s analysis looks
like a checklist as opposed to a nuanced balancing. If any pattern is to be
136
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Worme, supra note 57; Magoon, supra note 98; Omar, supra note 86 at paras 7, 23; RK,
supra note 72; Charlie, supra note 98; Randle, supra note 72. In these cases, the judge also
did not identify abuse of process.
RK, supra note 72; Randle, supra note 72 at para 4.
Buckley, supra note 11 at paras 100–01; Laflamme, supra note 51 at paras 31, 44, 48, 65;
South, supra note 50; M(S), supra note 51 at paras 74–76.
It may be helpful to recall that, based on the Hart framework, the judge will assess the
abuse of process only once the Crown has established, on a balance of probabilities, the
reliability of the evidence.
There are, however, examples of extreme situations where the evidence was admitted
and yet there were absolutely no factors that could reasonably be argued to increase
probative value. For instance, in some of the cases discussed above, the confessions were
admitted despite not being corroborated in any way and obtained through a number of
incentives (including threats) from an unsophisticated individual struggling with
significant financial difficulties and legal problems.

identified, it appears that the three cases where the common law confession
rule lead to the exclusion of the confession were at odds with what otherwise
appears to be a consistent approach: courts tend to overwhelmingly find
that the probative value of the confession is higher than the prejudice and
that Mr. Big obtained confessions are reliable, regardless of variations in the
operation’s scenarios.

2. Abuse of Process
Based on the Hart framework, even when the evidence is deemed
reliable, reliability will not justify the use of any investigative tactics.141
Rather, there are inherent limits to police power to manipulate for the
purpose of obtaining a confession.142 These limits exist in order to guard
against state power that society finds unacceptable and which threatens the
integrity of the justice system. Thus, the judge will have to consider if the
tactics employed threaten the fairness of the trial for the second prong. If
the confession was coerced through threats or exposure to violence, abuse
of process will almost always be present and the confession ought to be
excluded.143 Also, if the police preyed on the target’s vulnerabilities, it is
possible that the practice was abusive and, thus, the confession ought to be
excluded.144 Other factors may also be considered to assess abuse of
process.145
i. The Role of Violence and Threats
In Derbyshire, abuse of process was found based on the extreme level of
violence involved. Ms. Derbyshire was kidnapped and threated into
confessing. The Court of Appeal judge upheld the trial judge’s finding that
Ms. Derbyshire “made admissions because of fear created by the threatening
conduct of police officers. Whatever the respondent’s prior or current role
in illegal activities, it does not give to the police carte blanche to coerce
confessions”146 Yet, it is important to note that this was not a Mr. Big
scenario. This undercover operation was based on direct coercion, which is
rare in a Mr. Big scenario. In a second case where abuse was found based
on violence, Laflamme, the target was told that if he did not confess, his
141
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Hart, supra note 1 at para 112.
Ibid.
Ibid at paras 115–16.
Ibid at para 117.
Ibid at para 118.
Derbyshire, supra note 49 at para 142.

friend would be killed: “[h]e put his head on the chopping block for you.”147
That, together with extensive and extremely violent scenarios, led the judge
to find that the behaviour of the police was unacceptable and coercive.148
In 8% of the cases, despite the presence of threats or violence, the
judges found that there was no abuse of process because these were not
overt. In Randle,149 the accused was exposed to what appeared to be a
kidnapping and murder of a police informant. The accused’s confession was
admitted, and he was convicted. The Court of Appeal, in reviewing the Mr.
Big evidence, stated:
The officers created an air of intimidation by referring to violent acts committed
by members of the organization but did not threaten the appellant with violence
if he would not confess. None of the undercover officers' conduct was said to
approach abuse of the nature that would render the accused's statement
inadmissible”.150

In Balbar, the judge acknowledged the extensive threats and violence
used in the scenarios, yet stated:
While the Court is, of course, reluctant to be seen to condone any sort of violence,
threatened violence, racism or misogyny, it must be remembered that in terms of
violence and threatened violence, it is all staged, feigned and designed for a very
specific purpose. The words spoken and the activities of the police officers are
directed at creating an atmosphere considered appropriate for their
investigation…Mr. Balbar was more than willing to participate in activities
involving crime and threatened and feigned violence directed towards others. His
prior criminal record and other evidence indicate that Mr. Balbar had a familiarity
with crime and a lifestyle associated with illegal drugs and property offences. He
was not personally threatened.151

In Potter,152 one of the scenarios involved undercover officers enlisting
Mr. Potter’s help to dispose of an alleged human corpse (it was, in fact, a
pig corpse). The officers told Mr. Potter that things had gone wrong when
they went to collect money from a debtor and that they needed his help to
dispose of the evidence.153 In that case, the judge found no issue with the
147
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Supra note 51 at para 87.
Ibid at paras 84–87. It should be noted that, despite excluding the evidence, Laflamme
was found guilty by the trial jury. On appeal, the court overturned the decision and
entered a stay of proceedings.
Supra note 72 at para 4.
Ibid at para 67 [emphasis added].
Supra note 72 at paras 382–83 [emphasis added].
Supra note 64 at paras 54–55.
Ibid at para 52.

conduct of the police and did not analyze how the violent scene which Mr.
Potter was exposed to may impact the reliability of the confession.154 Instead
the judge stated: “Mr. Potter spoke to Cpl. R. of his own volition and he
was ready, willing and even eager to do whatever he could to endear himself
to Cpl. R. so he could work with him.”155
In RK,156 the Mr. Big confession was also admitted even though the
accused was subjected to two violent scenarios (scenarios 25 and 40). In
scenario 25, the officer slapped an individual in the face, who had allegedly
wronged him, in front of the target, and then “punched him in the stomach,
slapped him a second time and kicked his hat that had fallen on the
ground.”157 Although this was simulated violence, the accused believed that
it was genuine. In scenario 40, the undercover officer simulated another
assault, completed with fake blood coming from the person’s mouth. The
officer also told the victim (in front of the accused): “you fucken see me
coming or you see her coming that means you're fucken dead, and I will kill
you, I will fucken kill you, you don't talk to the fucken cops.”158 The judge
noted that “these scenarios had a legitimate purpose”159 and that “[g]iven
the nature of the murder being investigated, it is understandable that police
would want to create an atmosphere in which [the target]…would feel
comfortable discussing violence involving the use of firearms.”160
Indeed, the SCC has been clear that the creation of an air of
intimidation in and of itself is not the issue; rather it is when that
intimidation coerces the accused to provide incriminatory evidence.161
However, the coercive intimidation can arise from direct or indirect threats
and exposure to violence. While there is no bright light from where the
operations become abusive,162 the simple fact that the individual was “not
personally threatened” is an insufficient argument. The SCC was clear that
implied threats are threats just the same.163
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In addition, the argument that the individual confessed after exposure
to violence, which shows that he was not coerced, is used to justify abuse of
process (just as it was used to justify reliability).164 This argument was also
advanced by the Crown in Derbyshire, but it was promptly rejected by the
trial judge.165 Yet, in Derbyshire, the threats were direct and personal. In all
other cases, the judges accepted the argument that confessing after exposure
to violence shows a lack of coercion, as the threats were not direct or
personal.166 That is simply not the test for abuse of process.167 Also, none of
the Mr. Big cases where threats or violence were used discussed the SCC
statements that where threats and violence are present, there is almost
always coercion168 and that, in general, violence and threats of any kind are
unacceptable.169
Due to the discretion built into the test, it is not possible to assess
whether in the cases where threats or violence were noted, the judge was
wrong in finding that there was no coercion and thus, no abuse of process.
However, there are serious concerns regarding the arguments advanced to
reject abuse of process.
ii. Other Ways to Overbear the Will of the Accused
In the other two cases where the confessions were excluded based on
abuse of process, there were no threats or violence involved, but the judge
found that the accused was exploited and the police did not act in good
faith. In Nuttall, the target was impoverished, socially isolated, and looking
for spiritual meaning. He was given “true” friends, gifts, religious guidance,
and extensive travels.170 It appears that what crossed the line for this
particular judge was the manipulation of religion and the accused’s spiritual
needs in order to obtain the confession. This manipulation is not unique
to this case. What is unique is that, unlike most Mr. Big operations, Nuttall
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RK, supra note 72 at para 756; Potter, supra note 64 at para 225; Balbar, supra note 72 at
para 202; Randle, supra note 72 at para 67.
Derbyshire, supra note 49 at para 61.
RK, supra note 72 at para 709; Potter, supra note 64 at para 228; Balbar, supra note 72 at
para 354; Randle, supra note 72 at paras 67, 72.
Hart, supra note 1 at para 118; Derbyshire, supra note 49 at para 106.
Hart, supra note 1 at paras 116–17.
Ibid at para 117.
Nuttall, supra note 51 at para 792. It should be noted that, while the confession was
thrown out based on abuse of process, the accused was found guilty at trial. On appeal,
the court overturned the decision and entered a stay of proceedings.

was not set up to confess to murder. Rather, he was suspected of terrorist
involvement and this organization was set up as an organization with
terrorist ties. There was a clear entrapment component that was discussed
in this case, which is absent from the traditional Mr. Big operations. It is
possible that this aspect also rendered the judge more inclined to find abuse
of process.
The second case, M(S), was also a twist on the typical Mr. Big
operation.171 The target was 15 years old and he was not attracted into a
criminal organization with strangers.172 Rather, the police employed M(S)’s
father, who had been absent from his life, and had him re-enter his son’s
life to prey on his vulnerabilities and obtain a confession.173 The use of a
parent in these circumstances was a main contributor to the finding that
the fairness of the justice system was tampered with.174
Thus, in no typical Mr. Big operation was the police conduct found to
reach the level of manipulation that would rise to abuse of process, despite
the fact that in 56% of the cases, the target presented significant
vulnerabilities and was provided with strong incentives. This may be
because a substantive analysis of police conduct, in the context of
considering abuse of process, was absent from many of the cases reviewed.
For instance, in Caissie and Omar (both of which included extensive
vulnerabilities, strong incentives, and lengthy operations), the judges stated
that there was no abuse of process because there were no threats or violence
involved.175 No further analysis was performed on the other circumstances.
In other cases, the judges argued that traits deemed as “vulnerabilities”
in Hart did not count as true vulnerabilities for the purpose of abuse of
process in that case. As such, the issue of overbearing the targets’ wills did
not arise:
The background and life experience of Mr. Balbar are not shown on the evidence
to establish any particular vulnerabilities. There is no evidence that the police
preyed upon Mr. Balbar's apparent addiction to methamphetamines. In fact, there
is evidence to the contrary. With regards to a particular vulnerability due to limited
171
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Caissie, supra note 64 at para 437; Omar, supra note 86 at para 72. This is all the more
interesting since, as discussed above, in the 8% of the cases where threats or violent
scenarios were employed, the judges also concluded that there was no evidence of abuse
of process without any other analysis than the one used to assess reliability.

intellectual functioning, had Mr. Balbar's behaviour and reliable psychological
testing borne out a low level of intellectual functioning, then targeting him in the
Mr. Big operation might well have constituted an abuse of process. However, the
totality of the evidence before the Court does not support such a finding.176

In Amin, the judge went as far as to praise the officers in how they dealt
with the accused who was mentally ill and suffering from addictions:
[T]he officers went out of their way to evaluate Mr. Amin's vulnerability as a target.
They were fully aware of Mr. Amin's mental health issues and never, at any stage,
sought to exploit them. Even though Mr. Amin drank alcohol during his
interactions with the officers, there was no evidence of any kind of intoxication.
Nor did the officers encourage Mr. Amin to drink or supply him directly with
alcoholic beverages…There was no conduct constituting an abuse of process in this
case.177

Sometimes, the same argument used to mitigate the impact of
vulnerabilities, incentives, and threats on the probative value was also used
to argue that the willpower of the accused was not overborne and hence,
there was no abuse of process. These arguments included: that the accused,
though young or unsophisticated, had “street smarts”,178 that despite their
mental illness they were not someone that could be “easily manipulated”,179
or that although they were in financial distress, they were not destitute180
(so the police were not preying on their need). Other times, the judges
simply noted that despite the vulnerabilities identified, there was no
evidence that the police preyed on them.181
The discussion of abuse of process tends to be brief and dismissive. This
may very well be because, unlike for the first prong where the state has the
176
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burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the evidence is
reliable, the onus for the second prong is on the accused to establish that
an abuse of process occurred.182 Thus, if the accused fails to do so, the judge
would arguably be justified in saying “there is no evidence that abuse of
process occurred.” Yet, we believe this raises two distinct issues.
The first issue is that, when the burden shifts to the accused, the
evidence does not need to emanate from the accused, as it can also arise
from other circumstances of the case. Thus, as an example, it is incongruous
that after an extensive discussion on how an individual with addictions was
provided with alcohol, the court would conclude that there is no evidence
that the police took advantage of the addiction,183 without any further
analysis. It is unclear what other evidence the accused would need to prove
that his addiction was exploited. Perhaps this speaks to the high evidentiary
demands placed on the accused or the high standard required to prove
abuse of process. Despite the fact that the standard for proving abuse of
process is on a balance of probabilities (thus not particularly high), a remedy
for abuse of process is granted only in the clearest of cases. This does appear
to, in fact, elevate the standard beyond a balance of probabilities.
The second issue is that the evidence that the accused is required to
produce may not be fully in the possession of the accused184 or it may not
be feasible for the accused to produce it. Showing abuse of process often
requires the accused to testify. Given the high rates of mental illness,
addictions, lack of education, and unsophistication among the targets, they
may not make great witnesses. This results in the accused being put in a
position where it may be unrealistic for them to be able to demonstrate
abuse of process.
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We had the opportunity to review the disclosure materials in Buckley, supra note 11.
The file is voluminous and essential information is lost among irrelevant documents.
At the same time, parts of the file are redacted to protect the identity of the operatives
and the covert nature of the operations. Many of the targets do not always have
adequate representation, given their financial circumstances and the significant amount
of work required to engage with undercover disclosure files. This may raise additional
barriers in successfully raising arguments that abuse of process occurred. It should be
noted that for his part, Mr. Buckley had the good fortune of receiving excellent
representation from his lawyer, who managed to get the confession excluded on the
first prong.

It is peculiar that in all but one case185 where abuse of process was
found,
there was no confirmatory evidence. Confirmatory evidence should have no
impact on abuse of process. A strong confession obtained through
oppressive techniques should still be excluded.186 Yet, it seems that courts
are only willing to throw out a confession accompanied by some
confirmatory evidence when the most extreme level of violence is used.187
It is difficult to draw conclusions on how successful the Hart framework
has been in revamping the abuse of process doctrine. We are, however,
concerned that some courts appear to be conflating the analyses for the two
prongs. We also question whether the abuse of process prong can play a
significant role, given that the burden is on the accused to show abuse of
process. Courts also seem to be reluctant to exclude a confession on the
grounds that it was obtained in circumstances that fall short of direct threats
of violence, extreme violence, or circumstances atypical for Mr. Big
operations (such as entrapment). Yet, as recognized in Hart, and as further
discussed in the next chapter, police oppression that overcomes the will of
the accused may also occur in other ways. There is no evidence that the
abuse of process prong provides protection against police misconduct in
those cases.

IV. EVALUATION OF THE APPLICATION OF HART
It is possible that the Hart framework has been watered down beyond
its original intent.188 However, the Hart framework itself may also have some
weaknesses. Hart is an attempt to regulate an operation created with the
intent to evade the black letter law, even though its structure theoretically
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upsets so many rules and principles.189 By creating a rule whose application
is difficult to successfully appeal,190 the use of confessions resulting from
problematic operations remain unpredictable and largely unchecked.
Working from our case review, we now turn to what we perceive to be some
of the most concerning trends under the Hart framework.

A. Vulnerabilities Remain a Staple of Mr. Big Targets While
They Play a Minimal Role in the Admissibility Analyses
In Hart, Justice Moldaver noted that coercion may exist even in the
absence of threats or violence if the will of the target was overborne.191 This
is more likely to happen where the individual has a vulnerability that the
state took advantage of. These vulnerabilities include mental illnesses,
youthfulness, addictions, and socio-economic disadvantage.192
The presence of vulnerabilities does not immediately determine that
coercion was involved. Clearly, the fact that someone has a mental illness
or that they are young does not mean that they are incapable of deciding for
themselves whether or not they wish to talk about something. Yet, out of
the admitted confessions, 56% were obtained from people with an
identifiable vulnerability.193 The overrepresentation of vulnerable
individuals among Mr. Big targets is in itself unsettling. However, of even
more concern is that the factors that the SCC194 warned could increase
vulnerability and susceptibility to persuasion in the context of police

189
190

191
192

193

194

See e.g. Coughlan, supra note 2 at 419; Kaiser, supra note 2 at 307.
That is not to say that the Hart framework can never be useful on appeal. In fact, in R
v Yakimchuk, 2017 ABCA 101 it was the appeal court that applied the Hart framework
at first instance, while in Laflamme, supra note 51, it was the appeal court that found
abuse of process and entered a stay. But while the framework can work on appeal, in
practice, that happens very sparingly.
Supra note 1 at para 113.
Ibid at paras 117, 213. Similarly, in R v Otis, [2000] RJQ 2828, 2000 CarswellQue 3702
[Otis], the Court recognized that certain people are more susceptible to persuasion than
others. It cautioned that special attention needs to be paid to personal characteristics
when the accused is under police interrogation in order to determine if their section 7
rights have been infringed.
It should be mentioned that this number reflects only the situations where the trial
judge specifically identified a vulnerability that could, in some way, be documented. It
is likely that the number of targets that actually had various vulnerabilities is much
higher and that the trial judge did not or could not acknowledge them.
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interrogations are specifically targeted by police: addictions,195 intellectual
deficits,196 youthfulness,197 health,198 and financial or psychological stress.199
Psychologists are being brought in to help the police design operations
based on the characteristics of the accused in order to achieve maximum
success (that is, obtaining a confession).200
Despite their continued prevalence and role in these operations,
vulnerabilities were significantly downplayed in the cases we reviewed. In
the previous chapter, we illustrated some of the narratives employed by
judges to justify why vulnerabilities are of marginal relevance. The approach
taken by courts to vulnerabilities raises at least two distinctive issues. First,
it shows a disregard for how vulnerabilities interact with coercion and, by
extension, with the reliability of evidence and abuse of process.
Second, quite apart from the issues of reliability and abuse of process,
this approach is also problematic when viewed through disability and race
lenses.201 If the advice provided by Justice Moldaver that the police refrain
from targeting vulnerable people would have been applied, it is likely that
Mr. Big operations would eventually be phased out. That is not because
non-vulnerable people do not commit crimes; rather, it is because nonvulnerable people are less likely to fall for what is now a widely publicized
undercover technique, rooted in the manipulation of vulnerabilities.
Unfortunately, the data suggests that in subsequent applications of Hart,
judges may have sanctioned the continuing exploitation of vulnerable traits
and set a very high bar for when police conduct is considered impermissibly
exploitative.
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Due to space constraints, the development of this argument will have to be left for a
different occasion. We did, however, feel it was impossible to flag this collateral, yet
very important issue raised by these operations.

In addition, all of the information on vulnerabilities is based on the
trial judges’ appraisals, since no systematic data is collected by the designers
of these operations.202 Given the nature of these operations, the judicial
resistance to exclude what is deemed to be reliable evidence, and the
manner in which vulnerabilities are minimized when identified by a judge,
there is a distinct concern that the presence of vulnerabilities is
underreported, under-identified, and downplayed beyond what we are able
to ascertain based on a review of court cases. In addition, we are concerned
by the fact that information regarding the race and ethnicity of the targets
is not collected by the RCMP and, therefore, is not available. Finally, the
RCMP’s failure to collect information regarding their total number of
operations and scenarios removes any kind of oversight of the operations
that do not make it to trial. There is simply no way of knowing how many
operations were so extreme that the Crown declined to prosecute or how
many times such tactics were employed on people who refused to confess.
It is also possible that in these under-scrutinized stings, vulnerable and
racialized targets are overrepresented. Without oversight, accountability for
the consequences of such operations is not even theoretically possible.
While it is known that marginalized groups and individuals are
overrepresented at all levels of the criminal justice system, an investigative
tool that has historically been built overwhelmingly on these characteristics
should raise heightened concerns for human rights and disability rights
scholars and activists. Not only is there no evidence that the Hart framework
has led to more culturally sensitive approaches as some hoped, but it may
have also provided legitimacy to an under-scrutinized investigative tool that
may have disproportionate effects on marginalized groups.

B. The Hart Framework and Its Application Are Out of
Sync with Evidence-Based Psychological and Sociological
Studies on Coercion and Oppression
Statements that justify the lack of abuse of process by the absence of
direct threats and violence are at odds with socio-psychological evidencebased research that illustrates the large variety of effective coercion tactics.
The non-violent methods employed in Mr. Big, called “soft pressure tactics”
by forensic psychologists, are “qualitatively different but as effective as harsh
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pressure tactics” (i.e. threats and violence).203 Soft pressure is created by
using social influence techniques (such as reciprocity, consistency, creating
a persona that the target likes and identifies with, providing social
validation, using authority, and offering the target a commodity that is
scarce to them) and has been studied and validated as successful in causing
people to acquiesce to a request or change their behaviour based on real or
imagined group pressure.204 By consulting with trained psychologists,205
each Mr. Big operation tailors these tools for the specific target, often
guaranteeing that a confession will be obtained. Thus, in order to work,
these operations are laden with compliance-gaining techniques. Other
psychologists have suggested that they are the same tools, listed in the
Biderman’s Chart206 of coercion, used to gain compliance in other contexts
(e.g. in prisons or in the case of battered victims).207
It is unclear whether the failure to assess the coerciveness of soft tactic
techniques, especially when coupled with vulnerabilities, is a by-product of
a lack of knowledge or a resistance to exclude evidence that is so compelling.
While it is an incorrect application of the abuse of process doctrine, the
tendency to resist excluding reliable evidence, irrespective of police conduct,
has been scientifically proven.
For instance, a 2012 study208 asked judges to appraise culpability in
certain cases. In one group, the confessions were obtained through high
pressure techniques and there was some weak corroborative evidence; in the
other group, the same techniques were used, but there was no corroborative
evidence.209 The conviction rate increased fourfold in the first group
compared to the second, even where the judges agreed that some coercion
may have been involved.210 The study concluded that coercion and guilt are
overwhelmingly perceived as independent by judges.211 A number of other
studies have concluded that regular police interrogations (even where high
203
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pressure techniques were employed) were deemed to be less coercive where
the confession led to some confirmatory evidence.212 Sometimes when
confirmation was available, the trier of fact did not even consider whether
the confession was coerced.213 In Mr. Big scenarios, the risk of
(inadvertently) overlooking oppression due to perceive heightened
reliability may be even higher than for other types of confessions because of
the difficulties judges have in recognizing coercion when soft pressure
techniques are used. An unconscious bias may also exist against the suspect
who, more often than not, may be of dubious character, has confessed to a
serious crime, and may have a lack of sophistication that prevents them
from articulating an explanation.
While difficult to ascertain due to the small sample size, it is possible
that the approaches taken by judges in the cases reviewed are an illustration
of the trend identified in these studies. If so, there is a realistic possibility
that the second prong of the Hart framework, as applied, may not
adequately guard against overpowering the will of the individual.

C. Unreliable Confessions May Continue to be Admitted
Psychological studies show that false confessions are linked to
vulnerability, suggestibility, and compliance.214 Disposition factors such as
low IQs, decreased mental capabilities, youthfulness, and certain personality
traits significantly increase the risk that individuals will falsely confess when
pressed.215 While this is likely true for all confessions, the risk of a false
confession may be heightened in Mr. Big scenarios because, unlike during
police interrogations, the vulnerable suspect feels safe and is brought to
believe that a confession will only have positive consequences.216
This is likely part of the reason why Justice Moldaver strongly
recommended that the presence or absence of confirmatory evidence, as
well as the level of detail of the confession, be considered by the judge
212
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assessing the probative value of the statement.217 However, Justice Moldaver
also stated that reliability may arise from other sources than confirmatory
evidence.218 It is possible that what Justice Moldaver had in mind were
situations where the individual confesses in the absence of an identifiable
reason to lie (including inducements). While that may very well be the case
in other contexts, this will likely only happen in exceptional circumstances
in a Mr. Big scenario. These confessions are rarely organic; they are
frequently elicited. In the Mr. Big context, elicitation means that the suspect
is directly asked to confess after months of manipulation and after being
made to believe that the confession will have no negative consequences. Not
only that, but the target is made to believe that a confession will have
positive ones (i.e. consolidate the individual’s position within the
organization,219 make money and enjoy a lifestyle they never previously had
access to,220 and their legal problems will go away).221 It is difficult to imagine
what kind of sources, strong confirmatory evidence aside, could guarantee
the reliability of a confession obtained in such circumstances.222
In 21% of the reviewed cases, the evidence was admitted in the absence
of any confirmatory evidence (including holdback information) and despite
the fact that, in most of these cases, the judge identified both the presence
of vulnerabilities and the use of inducements. In addition, the presence or
absence of confirmatory evidence was not discussed in nearly 10% of the
cases. Thus, at least in these cases, the reliability of the confession may be
called into question. We suggest that there may be more.
In almost 70% of the cases, there was some form of confirmatory
evidence identified by the trial judges that may have weighted heavily in the
decision to admit the confessions. In all but one of these cases, the
confession was admitted.223 While confirmation, especially independent
confirmation, does increase reliability, it is not infallible. Issues with relying
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on any confirmatory evidence to avoid wrongful convictions have been well
documented.224
The independence and materiality of the confirmatory evidence (i.e.
evidence that corroborates the confession, is not derived from the
confession, and is relevant to a material issue of the confession) are seen as
necessary guarantees for the prevention of wrongful convictions. In other
words, the mere presence of some confirmatory evidence alongside a
confession is not equated with a safe basis for a conviction. It is not enough
that the corroboration restores the judge’s faith in the reliability of the
confession; it must also convince a judge beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused committed the offence.225
As discussed above, only 5% of the cases reviewed contained
independent evidence for corroboration. The other types of evidence were
either holdback information (44%), real evidence derived from the
confession (10%), or forensic evidence that confirmed the details offered in
the confession (11%). All of the confessions where some confirmation
existed (even when containing inconsistencies),226 were found to be reliable.
Unfortunately, overreliance on such evidence for boosting reliability
can be problematic. Psychologists suggest that a confession has the potential
to taint how the surrounding evidence is interpreted227 and thus, this
evidence is not as confirmatory as it is thought to be.228 This theory is called
confirmation bias: the process by which people preferentially seek out and
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interpret information in a manner that confirms their bias.229 The forensic
confirmation bias occurs in a situation where the person’s pre-existing
beliefs or expectations affects the “collection, perception and interpretation
of evidence during the course of a criminal case.”230 In other words, the
initial piece of evidence leads to a ‘verdict’ which leads to subsequent
evidence being evaluated in a manner that supports that verdict. Thus,
ambiguity and uncertainty are sometimes eschewed by artificially imposing
consistency between various pieces of evidence231 (such as details in a
confession and some forensic finding) or by downplaying the value of the
forensic evidence that is not consistent with the confession.232
One study demonstrated that experts who had previously read a
confession were more likely to erroneously conclude that the forensic
evidence from the accused, such as handwriting, fingerprinting, and even
DNA, was from the same person as the perpetrator.233 In addition, an
archival analysis of the DNA exonerations from the Innocence Project234
has shown that exonerees had often been convicted based on confessions
containing correct and graphic details of the crime. Most often, the false
confession had been accompanied by some confirmatory evidence such as
invalid or improper forensic science, eyewitness identification, and/or the
testimony of an informant.235 Confessions influenced the guilty verdict even
when the individual was coerced into confessing, had a psychiatric illness
or was under stress, and even when the confession was second hand
information from an informant.236
All this is not to say that corroboration, scientific or otherwise, is
without probative value. Rather, the problem lies with the failure to
recognize that any subjective judgements (such as an evaluation of the
meaning of scientific evidence or assessing how levels of detail match the
crime scene) are subject to error and tend to be presented to the trier of fact
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as more conclusive than they actually are.237 None of the cases contain any
discussion showing that the judge had even turned their mind to the
possibility of confirmation bias or to the fact that the prosecutor was
attributing too strong of a meaning to some pieces of evidence. In other
words, we are concerned that it appears that courts have adopted the idea
that confirmatory evidence is powerful in an absolute way: confessions are
always to be admitted where there is some confirmation, but confirmation
is not needed for admission. This unnuanced approach is particularly
dangerous when the confession is obtained from a questionable operation
that did not receive prior judicial authorization,238 which benefitted from
little to no other oversight, and yet has a reputation of being “highly
effective” in obtaining confessions that lead to convictions.239

V. CONCLUSION
The two prongs of the Hart test have been inconsistently applied by the
courts over the last 5 years. The new common law confessions rule does not
appear to have had a significant impact on the admissibility of evidence,
even in circumstances in which reliability is in question. The impact of the
abuse of process prong also appears negligible and there is a concern that
some judges may be inclined to overlook oppressive techniques that
overbear the will of the target where the confession appears to be reliable.
It is also unclear if judges have a clear understanding of the interactions
between vulnerabilities and incentives, on one hand, and abuse of process
and reliability, on the other. Given the small number of operations that
started post-Hart and which resulted in a trial at the time of writing, we
could not assess the impact that Hart had on the Mr. Big operations
themselves (whether they decreased in number post-Hart and whether their
237
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structure has changed). Yet, the fact that the framework had negligible
effects on confessions obtained during operations designed before its time
is a concern. The outcomes of the applications of Hart thus far raise the
question of whether there is any incentive for the RCMP to change the
manner in which they conduct these operations.
The potential concerns and failures we have identified in our review
could be a by-product of the framework itself, as much as of its subsequent
applications. A less flexible framework and a stricter requirement for the
oversight of each operation might be advisable. It is appropriate, and
perhaps essential, to generally allow judges some flexibility and discretion
in how they consider the various factors and tailor their findings to the
circumstances. Nonetheless, we question whether a flexible framework like
Hart is, in fact, appropriate for confessions obtained during operations that
do not benefit from robust oversight, for which, by the RCMP’s own
admission, basic data is not tracked, do not require judicial preauthorization, rely heavily on soft coercion techniques in which judges have
no expertise (and which are inherently difficult to understand and evaluate),
and are designed by expert psychologists (and still applied mostly to
vulnerable targets).
However, beyond the issues of the framework used and its application,
there is also a question of whether Mr. Big operations could ever be fully
brought under the rule of law.240 What makes these operations efficient in
obtaining confessions is also what makes them legally and ethically
problematic: that is, the exploitation of individual vulnerabilities,
monitoring the individual and creating scenarios tailored for their
personality that ensure they will not resist, and the use of inducements that
break the will of the accused. Should judges adequately scrutinize these Mr.
Big operations, it would be rare for the operations to avoid frustrating at
least one of the three main concerns raised by the SCC in Hart (that is,
reliability of the confessions, prejudice to the accused, and oppressiveness
of the operations). If that is the case, it begs the question of why Mr. Big
continues to be a legally authorized method of police investigation.
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